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Abstract 
What are the legitimate types of argument in constitutional 
debate? This is a perennial question in American law and every 
generation of constitutional scholars has the right to ask it anew. For over 
thirty years, Phillip Bobbitt’s taxonomy of legitimate constitutional 
argument types has reigned as the most influential and enduring in the 
scholarly discourse. In a recent article, Jamal Greene has proposed a 
welcome but flawed rhetorical re-conception of Bobbitt’s venerable 
typology. By identifying and correcting the errors in Greene’s framework, 
this Article provides a rigorous theoretical grounding for the entire 
constitutional law and rhetoric project. 
When properly grounded, constitutional law and rhetoric reveals 
how proof and persuasion operate in constitutional argument. The 
rhetorical perspective recognizes that our deepest constitutional disputes 
turn on value argument. Acknowledging value argument as a legitimate 
part of constitutional discourse in turn promotes rational discussion of the 
hard choices inherent in the Court’s most vexing cases. A fully developed 
constitutional law and rhetoric framework thus helps us assess these 
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What are the legitimate types of argument in constitutional debate? 
This is a perennial question in American law and every generation of 
constitutional scholars has the right to ask it anew. For over thirty years, 
Phillip Bobbitt’s taxonomy of legitimate constitutional argument types has 
reigned as the most influential and enduring in the scholarly discourse.1 In 
his recent article Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, Jamal Greene 
has proposed a rhetorical re-conception of Bobbitt’s venerable typology.2 
Though Greene’s rhetorical turn is welcome, his new typology is flawed. 
By identifying and correcting three critical errors in Greene’s framework, 
this Article provides a rigorous theoretical grounding for the entire 
constitutional law and rhetoric project.  
The first error identified is one of omission.3 Greene introduces a 
new rhetorical dimension to Bobbitt’s typology but fails to challenge 
Bobbitt’s propositional account of constitutional argument – the view that 
legitimate debate is solely confined to propositions about what the 
constitution means.4 Rhetoric comprehends the situation differently. 
Constitutional debates may involve appeals to reason (logos), authority 
(ethos) and/or emotion (pathos). While appeals to logos and ethos attack 
or defend specific propositions about constitutional meaning, appeals to 
                                                
1 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1985) [hereinafter, BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 (1989); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
(1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]. Literally hundreds of 
law review articles have referenced Bobbitt’s taxonomy over the years and two recent 
cites confirm its enduring influence. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in 
Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 579 n. 11 (2013); Lawrence 
B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 460 
(2013).  
2 See generally Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1389 (2013) [hereinafter Greene, Pathos]. It bears emphasis that the word 
“pathetic” in Greene’s title is actually the adjectival form of the Greek rhetorical 
word/concept “pathos.” Greene might have alternatively entitled his piece Pathos-Based 
Argument in Constitutional Law. 
3 This paragraph describes the argument advanced in Part III infra. 
4 We might characterize the propositional account as stating that legitimate constitutional 
arguments must always take this form: Proposition P (about the Constitution) is true 
because [constitutional argument]. 




pathos may directly support judgments about outcomes – who wins or 
loses particular cases. Such emotion-based judgments may derive from 
intuitive notions of right or wrong rather than from articulated 
propositions about constitutional meaning.5 Though Greene defends the 
legitimacy of pathetic argument in constitutional law, he fails to defend 
the legitimacy of non-propositional argument. This Article fills that gap. 
The second error corrected is taxonomic.6 Greene usefully 
distinguishes between the subjects of constitutional argument (e.g., text, 
history, doctrine, etc.) and modes of persuasion in argument (i.e., logos, 
ethos, and pathos). However, Greene uses inconsistent terminology to 
describe this key distinction. This Article clears up potential confusion by 
introducing two time-tested rhetorical terms. Subjects of constitutional 
argument are identified as rhetorical topoi while modes of persuasion are 
described as rhetorical pisteis. On-the-ground constitutional argument is 
then conceptualized as the intersection of topoi and pisteis – the union of 
content and form. This vocabulary not only brings theoretical precision, it 
also helps explain Bobbitt’s long misunderstood notion of “modality.”  
The third error identified has the most significance for general 
theories of constitutional adjudication.7 Greene consciously omits 
Bobbitt’s prior category of “ethical” argument from his new typology. 
This effectively removes “value argument” from the list of legitimate 
subjects of constitutional argument. This Article characterizes this move 
as descriptively and normatively flawed. Some of our society’s most 
profound constitutional disputes implicate deep and conflicting values. 
Advocates can and should appeal to those values in framing their 
constitutional arguments. If we wish to honestly confront what we really 
fight about when we fight about the Constitution, value argument needs to 
be restored to our constitutional law and rhetorical typology. 
Once these three basic errors are corrected, the constitutional law 
and rhetoric project will stand on stronger theoretical footing. Readers will 
                                                
5 We might characterize the non-propositional account as stating that legitimate 
constitutional argument may take this form: Litigant L wins (the instant constitutional 
controversy) because [constitutional argument].  
6 This paragraph describes the argument advanced in Part IV infra. 






understand the rhetorical nature of constitutional discourse and how proof 
and persuasion operate in constitutional argument. Such, at least, is this 
Article’s ambition. Now comes the roadmap:  
Part II sets the scene by describing Bobbitt’s basic typology and 
Greene’s proposed rhetorical modification. Part III identifies the challenge 
this modified typology poses to the standard propositional account of 
constitutional argument and defends its legitimacy. Part IV introduces the 
terms topoi and pisteis to clarify the distinction between constitutional 
subjects of argument and modes of persuasion.  
Part V is the longest and most important Part. It makes the case 
that value argument belongs in the constitutional law and rhetoric 
typology and includes a novel analysis of the nature of rhetorical ethos. It 
also illustrates how the theoretical constructs described in the Article 
apply to explain three key cases from First and Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. 
Part VI concludes. 
   
II. ARGUMENT TYPOLOGY AND RHETORIC  
Philip Bobbitt originally conceived his now-famous argument 
typology as part of an effort to account for the legitimacy of judicial 
review of constitutional questions by the Supreme Court.8 Previous 
scholars had wrestled with the democratic problem inherent in judicial 
review9 by advancing various arguments about the Constitution that all 
purported to legitimize review.10 On Bobbitt’s view, these scholarly 
debates could never “establish independent legitimacy for judicial review” 
because they were “conducted by means of arguments that themselves 
reflect[ed] a commitment to such legitimacy.”11 In essence, Bobbitt 
                                                
8 See generally BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 3-8. 
9 Alexander Bickel memorably dubbed this democratic problem “the countermajoritarian 
difficulty.” Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (1986). 
10 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 3-5 (describing typical arguments in favor of 
judicial review).  
11 Id. at 5. 




identified constitutional argument as a self-contained and self-referential 
discourse that necessarily assumed the legitimacy of judicial review.12  
Since constitutional argument could never provide an external 
justification for its own legitimacy, Bobbitt proposed instead to look 
inward. He aimed to understand the “legal grammar that we all share and 
that we have all mastered prior to our being able to ask what the reasons 
are for a court having power to review legislation.”13 The core elements of 
this legal grammar, on Bobbitt’s view, are the six archetypes of 
constitutional argument.14 The specific six archetypes are historical, 
textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential.15 
Participants in constitutional discourse “maintain” the legitimacy 
of judicial review through the continuous practice of archetypical 
arguing.16 At bottom, Bobbitt conceptualized “[j]udicial review [as] a 
practice by which constitutional legitimacy is assured, not endowed.”17 
Though this conception of judicial review is not universally accepted, 
                                                
12 The notion that a discourse cannot provide independent grounds for its own legitimacy 
has numerous philosophical parallels. Hart, for example, analyzed the “rules of 
recognition” that provide for the means of recognizing what counts as valid “law” in a 
legal system. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-110 (2d ed. 1994). 
Hart recognized that system’s “ultimate” rule of recognition cannot validate itself. Id. at 
107 (unlike regular rules of recognition, “there is no rule providing criteria for the 
assessment of [the ultimate rule’s] own validity.”). Rather, legitimacy of the ultimate rule 
is a social fact accepted by those that participate in the discourse. Id. at 108. Thomas 
Kuhn’s renowned “paradigms” of scientific thought demonstrate a similarly self-
referential and self-legitimizing concept. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94 (3d ed. 1996) (“in paradigm choice [,] there is no standard 
higher than the assent of the relevant community.”).  
13 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 6. 
14 Somewhat oddly, Bobbitt’s introduction in CONSTITUTIONAL FATE puts the number of 
archetypes at five. See id. at 7. Later in the book, he introduces ethical argument as a 
more controversial type. Id. at 93. By the book’s end, and in future work, Bobbitt 
confidently puts the number of argument at six. See id. at 246. See also BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at xi. 
15 See BOBBITT, FATE at 3-119; Bobbitt, INTERPRETATION at 12-13). Critically, Bobbitt 
refers to these six argument types as “constitutional modalities.” BOBBITT, 
INTERPRETATION at 12. The meaning of modality has divided critics; this Article brings 
new perspective on its meaning by applying a rhetorical lens. See infra Part III.  
16 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 8. Though they can maintain 
legitimacy, the none of the arguments “taken singly or together, justify judicial review.” 
Id.  






constitutional law scholars continue to embrace the argument typology 
forged from Bobbitt’s Wittgensteinian theory.18 Bobbitt’s typology has 
endured for more than thirty years. 
Enter Jamal Greene. Greene argues that Bobbitt has failed to 
recognize a critical distinction between the “subjects of [constitutional] 
argument” and the “forms of rhetoric” that animate those arguments.19 
Drawing on Aristotle, Greene then identifies the three ancient “forms of 
rhetoric” as logos, ethos, and pathos.20 He finally proposes that 
constitutional arguments should be classified on a two-dimensional grid 
instead of in Bobbitt’s one-dimensional list of archetypes. One axis of 
Greene’s new grid features five (not six) of Bobbitt’s subjects of 
constitutional argument; the other axis features logos, ethos, and pathos.21 
Reading the two axes of the grid together shows how “each form [of 
rhetoric] may be used to modify a particular subject of constitutional 
argument.”22  
The genius of Greene’s schema lies in its systematic coupling of 
constitutional law and rhetoric. Constitutional scholars have long 
contested “whether constitutional law is a specialized discourse or is 
instead continuous with other practical forms.”23 By turning to ancient 
                                                
18 Bobbitt explicitly identifies his understanding of “the process of legal argument” with 
Wittgenstein. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 123 n. 1. I count myself among 
those persuaded that judicial review and constitutional argument are usefully understood 
as “language games.” Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS pt. I, § 23, at 
11 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958) (“[T]he term ‘language-game’ is meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a 
form of life.”).  
19 Greene, Pathos at 1394. Though Greene focuses on Bobbitt, he aims his critique more 
generally at all “[t]axonomists of constitutional argument.” Id. at 1391. Richard Fallon is 
probably the second-most widely known constitutional argument taxonomist. See id. at 
1391, n. 14 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1987)). 
20 Greene, Pathos at 1394-95. See also id. at 1391, n 1. (citing ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: 
A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991)). 
Greene also describes logos, ethos, and pathos as “modes of persuasion.” Id. at 1394. For 
explanation of the terms logos, ethos, and pathos, see infra at 11.  
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1424. 
23 Greene, Pathos at 1466-7 (reviewing debate between “mainstream” legal scholars, 
“attitudinalists,” and “pragmatists” who all differ on whether constitutional law’s 




rhetoric, Greene cuts through this intractable jurisprudential debate. His 
grid illustrates just how constitutional arguments can revolve around 
specialized subjects while simultaneously deploying modes of persuasion 
common to all practical argument. In the adjudicative context, a “judge 
may seek to persuade the audience as to the substance or valence of 
arguments from history, text, structure, precedent and consequences 
through any of the three modes of persuasion [logos, ethos, pathos].”24  
Greene’s insight helps bridge a gap that has unnecessarily divided 
the study of law and rhetoric from mainstream constitutional scholarship.25 
Rhetoric provides a lens for viewing constitutional argument both as a 
species of practical argument and as a specialized discourse unto itself.26 
                                                                                                                     
ostensibly specialized discourse actually constrains judicial reasoning and case 
outcomes.).  
24 Id at 1424. 
25 See id. at 1393 (noting that “[l]aw and literature scholars have approached law as a 
form of rhetoric, but have not much integrated their accounts with those offered within 
more mainstream constitutional scholarship.” (citing JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ 
BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); Robert A. Ferguson, 
The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201(1990))). Of course, 
the law and rhetoric literature has grown enormously since the work of pioneers like 
professors White and Ferguson. See, e.g., The Dynamics of Stasis: Classical Rhetorical 
Theory and Modern Legal Argumentation, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 171 (1989); THE RHETORIC 
OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds. 1994); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of 
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995);  
Marouf A. Hasian, Jr. & Earl Croasmun, Rhetoric’s Revenge: The Prospect of a Critical 
Legal Rhetoric, 29 PHIL. & RHETORIC 384 (1996); BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AT 
FIFTY: A RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Clarke Rountree ed. 2004); NEIL MACCORMICK, 
RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING (2005); FRANCIS J. 
MOOTZ III, RHETORICAL KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL PRACTICE AND CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 
(2006); Michael R. Smith, Rhetorical Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 3 J. ASSOC. LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129 (2006); Linda L. Berger, 
Studying and Teaching ‘Law as Rhetoric’: A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 
3 (2010); Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, A Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and 
Practice in the Legal Writing Classroom, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 319 (2011). Despite the 
vastness of this literature, it remains true that its contributors have not systemtically 
integrated their accounts with Bobbitt’s influential argument typology of constitutional 
argument. But see EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL 
REASONING, CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 161-5 (2004) (analyzing Bobbitt’s 
typology as demonstrating argumentative pluralism in law). Greene’s innovation was 
thus long overdue.   
26 Here I develop concepts introduced in prior rhetorical work. See Colin Starger, Death 
and Harmless Error: A Rhetorical Response to Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 






At its heart, rhetoric promotes a radical discursive awareness that explains 
how proof and persuasion operate in any field. 
 As Aristotle defined it, the art of rhetoric is “an ability, in each 
[particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.”27 Note how 
Aristotle confines rhetoric to the “available” means of persuasion. Means 
of persuasion available in one discourse may not be available at all in 
another. Proof admissible in one field of argument may be entirely 
illegitimate in a different field.28 As Chaїm Perelman observes: “Each 
field of thought requires a different type of discourse; it is as inappropriate 
to be satisfied with merely reasonable argument from a mathematician as 
it would be to require scientific proofs from an orator.”29 Rhetoric 
recognizes this reality yet still provides a systematic approach to proof and 
persuasion that applies across all argument fields.30  
Logos, ethos, and pathos form the backbone of this systematic 
approach. Logos concerns reason.31 Ethos concerns authority.32 And 
pathos concerns emotion. Aristotle classified all three of these concepts as 
rhetorical species of pistis (plural: pisteis).33 Although Greene usually 
                                                                                                                     
Logos, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045 (2009); Colin Starger, The Virtue of 
Obscurity, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 17 (2013). 
27 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 37 (George A. Kennedy 
trans., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED]. Please note that 
although I will generally refer to the second edition of George Kennedy’s Aristotle 
translation, Professor Greene relies exclusively on the first edition. See supra note 20. 
28 See STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 14 (Updated ed. 2003) (defining 
argument fields). 
29 CHAЇM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 3 (William Kluback tr. 1982). 
30 Cf. TOULMIN, supra note 28, at 14-5 (distinguishing between “the form and merits of 
our arguments” that are “field-invariant” and “field-dependent.”).      
31 Although Greene translates logos as “appeal[] to logic”, Greene, Pathos at 1394, I have 
previously argued at length why rhetorical logos more broadly concerns argument based 
on reason. See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 26 at 1054-55. In short, logic 
has a narrow and formal connotation that does not capture the range of rational argument 
properly implied by logos. Id. 
32 Greene defines ethos as “appeal[] to the speaker’s character.” Greene, Pathos at 1395. 
However, I see rhetorical ethos as more broadly concerning appeals to authority. See 
infra at 18-20 (setting out justification for this view).  
33 See RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 38-9. Aristotle distinguishes between pisteis 
intrinsic to the art of rhetoric – logos, ethos, and pathos – and extrinsic or “non-artistic” 
pisteis. Id. at 38. The conceptual difference between artistic and non-artistic pisteis rests 
on invention. Advocates do not invent non-artistic pisteis; they are externally provided, 
and advocates use them to prove their case. Id. Aristotle identified several extrinsic 




refers to the pisteis as “forms of rhetoric” or “modes of persuasion”,34 it 
bears emphasis that the word may also be translated as “proof.”35 
Acknowledging logos, ethos, and pathos as species of proof as well as 
modes of persuasion drives home the rhetorical perspective. Proof in a 
discourse is what persuades in a discourse.36  
Although ancient in origin, this perspective on proof has radical 
contemporary implications when applied to constitutional discourse. 
Specifically, the rhetorical perspective suggests that proof in constitutional 
argument is not strictly governed by propositional logic. Even as he 
defends the legitimacy of pathos-based appeals, Greene fails to come to 
grips this implication. This Article therefore takes up the task.  
 
III. PATHOS AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL ARGUMENT 
When Bobbitt first set down his theory of constitutional argument 
types, he proposed to describe each type using a term of art: “modality.”37 
Significantly, Bobbitt borrowed the concept of modality from analytic 
philosophy and then applied this analytic concept to law.38 He defined 
constitutional modalities as “the ways in which legal propositions are 
characterized as true from a constitutional point of view.”39 On Bobbitt’s 
                                                                                                                     
proofs such as “witnesses”, “testimony of slaves taken under torture”, and “contracts.” Id. 
In broad strokes then, non-artistic proofs concern evidence rather than argument.  
34 See, e.g., Greene, Pathos at 1394 (labelling a pathetic appeal as “a mode of persuasion” 
and then distingsuishing subjects of argument from “forms of rhetoric.”). 
35 RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 31, n. 11. Depending on context, pistis may take on 
many meaning including “appeal”, “belief”, “trust” and “faith.” Id. See also GARVER, 
supra note 25, at 3 (framing entire book of essays as “a meditation on the connections 
among those terms [translating pistis].”).  
36 More than this, the very concept of a “discourse” – a communication triangle joining 
speaker, audience, and subject matter in language – is itself bounded by logos, ethos, and 
pathos. See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 26 at 1056, n. 46. Cf. Greene, 
Pathos at 1399 (rhetoric “is attuned not just to speaker (hence, ethos) and subject (hence, 
logos) but also to audience (hence, pathos).). 
37 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AT 11-22. 
38 See id. at 12 (n. 3) & 194 (discussing modal analysis of Russell and Carnap). For a 
rigorous analysis of the role of modality in practical argument, see generally TOULMIN, 
supra note 28, at 28-36 (distinguishing between the force and criteria of modal terms). 
Toulmin specifically faults Carnap for “failing to attend sufficiently to the practical 
function of modal terms.”).  Id. at 44.  






widely shared view, bone fide constitutional arguments are thus 
propositional. We might characterize their basic form like this: 
Proposition P (about the Constitution) is true because [constitutional 
argument]. 
From a rhetorical perspective, propositional accounts of 
constitutional argument misunderstand the nature of legal adjudication. 
The law adjudicates disputes. As in all cases, judges in constitutional 
disputes must decide the case.40 Judges must judge.41 Establishing the 
truth or falsity of legal propositions is thus secondary to reaching 
judgment. In any given case, the bottom line is who wins or loses. On this 
adjudicatory view, constitutional arguments provide the grounds for 
deciding who wins or loses constitutional cases. We might characterize 
this argument form: Litigant L wins (the instant constitutional 
controversy) because [constitutional argument]. 
Since arguments in constitutional adjudication ultimately seek to 
persuade judges about outcomes in concrete cases, any analogy between 
legal argument and dispute in formal scientific or mathematical discourse 
is incomplete. Arguments in purely analytic disciplines can exclusively 
turn on abstract propositions because there is no judgment imperative. 
Proving or disproving propositions is the only point of the argument. Not 
so in law. Judgment comes first and judgment is not always analytic. 
Now it is of course correct that most constitutional argument is 
propositional. Giving reasons why proposition P (about the Constitution) 
is true or false is both extremely desirable and absolutely critical for the 
development of constitutional law over time. Propositional arguments 
drive academic constitutional law discourse and dominate the text of non-
                                                
40 Though Bobbitt’s typology rests on a propositional account of constitutional 
argument,, even he recognizes the primacy of decision-making in constitutional 
adjudication. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION at 166-7 (recounting story of a then-newly 
appointed Judge Henry Friendly seeking advice from his mentor Judge Learned Hand on 
how to approach a tricky legal problem; Hand listened and then said: “Damn it, Henry, 
Just decide it! That’s what you’re paid for.”). 
41 Perhaps the most famous codification of this judgment imperative is Article 4 of the 
Napoleanic Code, prohibited judges fom refusing to decide cases “on the ground of the 
silence, obscurity, or deficiency of the law.” See CHAЇM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-
TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 131 (John Wilkinson & 
Purcell Weaver tr., 1969).  




perfunctory Supreme Court opinions. This is as it should be – given the 
law’s commitment to elaborating coherent rules. Thus, we can 
characterize the vast majority of constitutional arguments as having this 
form: Litigant L wins (the instant constitutional controversy) because 
proposition P (about the Constitution) is true à Proposition P is true 
because [constitutional argument].  
So when do constitutional arguments take non-propositional 
forms? When do arguments directly support judgment without making a 
specific claim about constitutional meaning? In a word, the answer here is 
pathos. Pathos-based arguments sometimes make non-propositional 
appeals to judgment. Though Greene never challenges Bobbitt’s 
propositional conception of modality, his conceptualization of pathos in 
constitutional adjudication effectively makes the point: 
[I]n constitutional law, pathos is better described as a 
feature of constitutional conversation, a means rather than 
an end. The appeal to pathos occurs not because pathos 
offers information about the substantive constitutional 
content but because appealing to pathos helps win 
constitutional arguments. Pathetic legal argument, then, is a 
mode of persuasion as to the substance or valence of 
particular legal propositions.42  
In other words, pathos-based arguments do not always directly assert 
substantive propositions about the Constitution. Sometimes pathos-based 
appeals provide valence; they give emotional weight to particular 
propositions elsewhere advanced through logos- and/or ethos-based 
argument.  
This is an important insight. Without making the point explicitly, 
Greene’s article demonstrates that Bobbitt’s concept of modality needs to 
be modified to account for non-propositional pathetic appeals. Pathetic 
appeals bypass ordinary propositional argument by directly 
“manipulat[ing] the reader’s emotions in order to persuade her [] as to the 
ultimate adjudicative outcome.”43 As Greene elegantly puts it: “Some 
                                                
42 Greene, Pathos at 1422. 






outcome must be thus because deep down in your heart you know thus to 
be true.”44 
To get a flavor of how non-propositional argument plays out in 
practice, consider a brief example. Greene points us to Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart, a case concerning a Nebraska state law that 
prohibited so-called “partial birth” abortions.45 A five-Justice majority 
struck down the Nebraska law.46 In his dissent, Kennedy described the 
contested abortion procedure this way: “The fetus, in many cases, dies just 
as a human adult or child would: it bleeds to death as it is torn limb from 
limb.”47 According to Greene, Kennedy’s “gruesome description” in this 
passage is “designed deliberately to disgust and shame the audience” and 
is “integral to the dissent’s rhetorical mission.”48  
Now critics sympathetic to Bobbitt might object to calling the 
quote from Kennedy an argument – or at least to calling the quote a 
complete argument. Instead, Kennedy’s words seem to constitute a move 
within an argument. According to this critique, it is wrong to call this 
move an argument because Kennedy’s description does not state a 
proposition about what the Constitution means. It does not posit that 
outlawing partial-birth abortions is permissible under the Constitution 
because “the fetus… bleeds to death as it is torn from limb to limb.”  
The rhetorical response to this critique invokes the judgment 
imperative. All argument in Carhart ultimately supported judgment on 
Nebraska’s law, whether it would stand or fall.  Although Kennedy’s 
“gruesome description” does not defend a specific proposition about the 
Constitution, it does express a coherent ground for ruling in favor of 
Nebraska. It expresses the argument that Nebraska should win because of 
the horror of the gruesome procedure.  
Recognizing Kennedy’s pathos in Carhart as an argument does not 
mean his was a good argument or a legitimate one. Let us focus on the 
                                                
44 Id. at 1422. 
45 See id. at 1394 (discussing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)). 
46 Carhart, 530 U.S. 936-7 (finding law unconstitutional because it lacked any exception 
for preservation of health of mother). 
47 Id. at 958-9 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
48 Greene, Pathos at 1394. 




legitimacy question for a moment.49 If it stood alone, Kennedy’s pathos 
would in fact be illegitimate. This is precisely because his argument 
defends no proposition about the Constitution. (Propositions are necessary 
for legitimacy). Kennedy’s pathos, however, does not stand alone. His 
pathos instead works in conjunction with his doctrinal argument that the 
Nebraska law was consistent with rules set down in precedent.50 While his 
doctrinal argument primarily proceeds via appeals to reason (logos) and 
authority (ethos), Kennedy’s pathos provides an emotional impetus to 
accept his doctrinal interpretation above that of the majority.  
Even if we disagree with Kennedy’s doctrinal argument, we cannot 
deem it illegitimate – it did not fundamentally deviate from accepted 
norms of constitutional debate. Since Kennedy’s pathos only served to 
give his otherwise legitimate doctrinal argument emotional valence, it 
would be pointless to judge his pathos illegitimate. Pathetic arguments 
may not assert propositions about constitutional meaning, but pathos plays 
an integral role in persuasion and is unavoidable when judgment is at 
stake. This is a necessary implication of Greene’s article and a point worth 
making explicit.  
 
IV. PISTEIS, TOPOI AND MODALITY 
Bobbitt’s original typology names six different constitutional 
“modalities”: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential and 
ethical. Greene now challenges this typology as failing to distinguish 
between the “subjects” of constitutional argument and its “forms of 
rhetoric.”51 Greene identifies the forms of rhetoric as logos, ethos, and 
pathos and claims that all of Bobbitt’s archetypes (except ethical 
argument) are better understood as subjects of constitutional argument.52 
While the distinction between constitutional subjects and modes of 
                                                
49 On the other hand, assessing the merits of the conflicting positions in the abortion 
debate is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
50 Kennedy’s doctrinal argument focused on Casey. See generally Carhart, 530 U.S. at 
960-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (analyzing requirements under Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern PA v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).   
51 Greene, Pathos at 1394. 






rhetoric is analytically sound, Greene’s new framework suffers from 
terminological confusion. This Part therefore makes a brief taxonomic 
intervention. 
Consider the table below, which is a simplified version of one that 
appeals in Greene’s article under the heading: MODALITIES OF ARGUMENT 
AND MODES OF PERSUASION. 
 Logos Ethos Pathos 
Text    
History    
Doctrine    
Structure    
Consequences    
 
Figure 1 – Greene’s Argument Table53 
The labels for each axis implied by the table heading are less than ideal. 
“Modes of persuasion” refers to logos, ethos, and pathos while 
“Modalities of Argument” presumably refers to text, history, doctrine, 
structure, and consequences.  
The issue with the “modes of persuasion” label is relatively minor. 
In his article, Green refers to logos, ethos, and pathos as “forms of 
rhetoric” or “modes of persuasion.”54 While these two descriptions are 
quite correct, it is important to recall that pisteis – the word Aristotle used 
to describe the rhetorical genus uniting the species of logos, ethos, and 
pathos – can also be translated as “proof.”55 Using the same word to 
describe proof and persuasion hammers home the rhetorical perspective on 
discourse: proof is what persuades. In order to keep this perspective 
                                                
53 See id. at 1443 (Table).  
54 See, e.g., Greene, Pathos at 1394 (labelling a pathetic appeal as “a mode of persuasion” 
and then distingsuishing subjects of argument from “forms of rhetoric.”). 
55 See supra at 7-8. 




present, it seems prudent to generically refer to logos, ethos, and pathos as 
pisteis.56 
The problem with Greene’s “modalities of argument” label is more 
serious. Elsewhere in his article, Greene variously refers to the legitimate 
“subjects” of constitutional argument as “types”, “archetypes” and 
“modalities.” While Greene’s type/archetype nomenclature makes sense,57 
his use of “modality” elides the very distinction he seeks to establish. This 
is because “modality” is Bobbitt’s term of art and Greene’s basic claim is  
that Bobbitt’s framework improperly fails to distinguish between 
rhetorical mode and constitutional subject. Given this, it seems unwise to 
utilize Bobbitt’s loaded term of art at all.58  
Sticking to Aristotle’s rhetorical nomenclature avoids such 
confusion. The appropriate rhetorical term for the axis referring to the 
subjects of constitutional argument is topos (plural: topoi).  Topos means 
“place” and topoi are often referred to as “rhetorical topics.”59 For 
                                                
56 Greene does refer to pisteis once in his article. See Greene, Pathos at 1398. My modest 
suggestion is to use the term generically. 
57 As a synonym for “category”, “type” carries no distracting substantive or analytical 
connotations. “Archetype” is a similarly generic term for a quintessential category. 
58 To make matters worse, Greene at one point suggests that Bobbitt’s understanding of 
modality actually better aligns with the modes of persuasion defined by logos, ethos, and 
pathos. Id. at 1445, n. 312. This would suggest that the labels on Greene’s grid should be 
reversed. Greene’s equivocation between “modality” as “subject” versus “mode of 
persuasion” results in sentences like this: “Each [case] fits into a more conventional 
modality – just not the logical mode of that modility.” Id. at 1445. Refferring to the the 
modes of a modality is as imprecise as referring to the parts of a partition. 
59 RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 44. See also Katie Rose Guest Pryal, A SHORT 
GUIDE TO WRITING ABOUT LAW 34 (2010). Rhetoricians sometimes refer to topoi by their 
Latin name – loci (singular: locus). See, e.g., PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra 
note 41, at 83-99 (analyzing various loci in argument). Of course, Topics is also the name 
of Aristotle’s treatise on dialectical reasoning. Id. at 5, 83. As Perelman has persuasively 
demonstrated, Aristotle’s separate treatment of “dialectic” in Topics and “rhetoric” in On 
Rhetoric rests on an analytically unnecessary distinction between arguments before 
individuals and crowds. PERELMAN, supra note 29, at 4-5. Modern rhetoric is rightly 
concerned with discourse addressed to any sort of audience and therefore subsumes the 







Aristotle, topoi were the metaphorical places in a discourse where 
speakers could look to find stock themes to build their arguments.60  
Aristotle distinguished between “common topics” and “special 
topics.”61 Common topics referred to lines of argument potentially 
relevant across all discourses.62 This included arguments about “the 
possible and impossible”, “past and future fact” and “degree of magnitude 
or importance” as well as arguments from grammatical form, analogy, 
definition, division, induction, purpose, consequence, and so on.63 Special 
topics, on the other hand, were discourse-specific. For example, special 
topics in politics considered subjects like finances, war and peace, national 
defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws.64 Aristotle also 
analyzed special topics in judicial rhetoric, systematically considering 
subjects relevant to debates over “justice and injustice” and “wrongdoers 
and those wronged.”65 
Returning to Bobbitt and Greene, it seems proper to describe as 
special constitutional law topoi those argument categories described by 
text, history, structure, doctrine, and consequences.66 These topoi point to 
the subjects for argument accepted as legitimate in constitutional 
controversies. If an advocate or judge wishes to make an argument for or 
against the constitutionality of a contested law, for example, she will 
consider lines of analysis elaborating upon topoi of text, doctrine, or so on. 
                                                
60 See RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 44. As Kennedy points out, ancient rhetorical 
handbooks also provided literal places to find topoi. Id. See also PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 41, at 83 (“As used by classical writers, loci [topoi] are 
headings under which arguments can be classified. They are associated with a concern to 
help a speaker’s inventive efforts and involve a grouping of relevant material so that it 
can easily be found again when required. Loci have accordingly been defined as 
storehouses for arguments.”). 
61 See RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 45 and n. 68. 
62 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 41, at 83. 
63 See RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 157-161, 172-184. As a relentless classifier, 
Aristotle naturally used different words to describe different kinds of common topics. 
However, it seems best not to dive too deeply into Greek soup for the purposes of this 
constitutional law and rhetoric project. 
64 Id. at 53 
65 See id. at 92-100. 
66 For now, I leave off Bobbitt’s category of ethical argument. Part IV below will re-
introduce this category and argue for the necessity of its inclusion in the list of legitimate 
constitutional topoi. 




At the same time, she will not waste time inventing arguments wholly 
disconnected from these legitimate topics.67  Constitutional law topoi 
neither state transcendent truths about the Constitution nor indicate 
answers to disputed questions. Rather, they provide subject-matter tools to 
aid invention.  
The two-dimensional approach thus disaggregates Bobbitt’s 
framework along the axes of content and form. While topoi inspire the 
content of argument, pisteis provide rhetorical form. This disaggregation 
actually helps clarify the meaning of Bobbitt’s troublesome notion of 
“modality.”  
As noted above, Bobbitt defined constitutional modalities as “the 
ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a 
constitutional point of view.”68 Ways of characterizing constitutional truth 
necessarily involve both content and form. Modality is thus best 
understood as describing the discursive intersection of topoi and pisteis – 
the union of content and form in actual constitutional argument. This 
modified understanding of modality can be visualized using a new grid. 
 
                                                
67 Though he does not use the term, Bobbitt vivedly describes the futility of advancing 
arguments not drawn from accepted topoi. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 6 
(“One does not see counsel argue, nor a judge purport to base his decision on arguments 
of kinship… Nor does one hear overt religious arguments or appeals to let the matter be 
decided by chance or reading entrails.”). 
68 See supra note 39. As argued above, I find Bobbitt’s insistence that modality is 







Figure 2 – Constitutional Modalities: Union of Pisteis and Topoi 
 
Careful readers will note that the figure above changes more than 
just the labels on Greene’s table. The list of topoi contains one subject of 
constitutional dispute that Greene does not recognize – value argument. 
This Article maintains that Greene’s failure to include value argument as a 
legitimate topos is a critical error and the one that most threatens the 
vitality of the constitutional law and rhetoric project. The next Part 
defends that charge. 
 
V. VALUE ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
After transforming Bobbitt’s one-dimensional list of argument 
modalities into a two-dimensional grid, Greene proposes another major 
structural change to Bobbitt’s typology. Specifically, Greene advocates 
removing Bobbitt’s category of “ethical argument” from the list of 
legitimate constitutional subjects of argument (which we now call topoi).69 
Greene’s move has obvious roots in Bobbitt’s peculiar nomenclature: 
Bobbitt defines “ethical” arguments as “deriving rules from those moral 
commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the 
Constitution.”70 Greene interprets this reference to ethos as invoking a 
                                                
69 Id. at 1443-44.  
70 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 13 (italics added). 




concept “parallel to rather than modified by logos and pathos.”71 He 
therefore concludes that “ethical argument” is better understood as 
invoking a mode of persuasion (which we now call pistis).72 
The problem with Greene’s analysis is that it conflates different 
meanings of ethos. Bobbitt never used ethos in the rhetorical or 
argumentative sense. Rather, Bobbitt’s category of ethical argument 
essentially mirrors what Richard Fallon later called “value arguments.”73 
Greene’s reclassification of Bobbitt’s ethical category thus infelicitously 
removes value arguments from the list of legitimate constitutional law 
topoi. This is a mistake because value arguments play a vital role in 
constitutional adjudication. The obvious solution is to reinstate value 
arguments as a legitimate constitutional topos and to acknowledge the 
logos-, ethos-, and pathos-based dimensions of this subject.  
A. Ethical Argument v. Proof by Ethos 
Since Bobbitt’s ethical modality has attracted criticism, Greene’s 
purging of the category from his argument typology is understandable. 
Indeed, some have denounced the ethical modality as “misleading” and 
“seriously flawed.”74 These critics have a point; Bobbitt’s analysis of 
ethical argument can be obscure. Despite this academic bathwater, there is 
a baby worth saving. For Bobbitt is surely correct that the moral 
commitments of our constitutional system remain a legitimate subject for 
constitutional argument.  
Greene’s apparent rejection of this sensible position may be rooted 
in terminological confusion. The culprit word is “ethical.” Greene argues 
that “remaining faithful to the Aristotelian conception of ethos” requires 
him to interpret Bobbitt’s ethical category of argument as “parallel to 
rather than modified by logos and pathos.”75 In other words, ethos belongs 
                                                
71 Greene, Pathos at 1443. 
72 Id. at 1444. 
73 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1204-9. 
74 See Greene, Pathos at 1444 (citing Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, 67 MINN. L. REV. 
1328, 1332 (1982); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 665, 671 (1984)). 






in the same category as logos and pathos. Though this sounds reasonable 
enough, the reality is that Bobbitt never used ethos in its rhetorical sense.  
The word ethos actually has multiple meanings. In Constitutional 
Fate, Bobbitt explains the meaning he intended: 
In the end I decided on the term ‘ethical’ largely because of 
its etymological basis. Our word ‘ethical’ comes from the 
Greek ἠθικός (ethikos), which meant “expressive of 
character” when used by the tragedians. It derives from the 
ἦθος (ethos) which once meant the habits and character of 
the individual, and is suggestive of the constitutional 
derivation of ethical arguments.76 
This passage makes crystal clear that Bobbitt uses ethos/“ethical” in the 
manner of the Greek tragedians – not Greek rhetoricians.77 Tragedians 
embraced “character” as a poetic-moral concept. Consistent with this, 
Bobbitt invokes ethos only in its derived, ordinary-English sense: “the 
distinguishing character, moral sentiment, moral nature, or guiding beliefs 
of a person, group, or institution.”78 (Since he uses it in its ordinary-
English sense. Bobbitt does not subsequently italicize “ethos.”) Bobbitt’s 
ethical modality thus concerns moral beliefs inherent in the American 
constitutional ethos. 
 Contrast this with the technical meaning of ethos in rhetoric. In 
argument theory, ethos refers to form of proof, a mode of persuasion. 
Rather than proof by reason (logos) or emotion (pathos), ethos concerns 
proof by authority. Aristotle rooted his concept of ethos in the authority an 
argument’s advocate – the speaker.79 Though Aristotle undeniably linked 
proof by ethos to the “character” of the speaker, his underlying focus was 
                                                
76 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 95. 
77 Despite some overlap, the tragedians and rhetoricians were by and large separate. 
Aristotle did write about theory of tragedy in Poetics, of course, and therein analyzed 
ethos as a tragic concept. However, he did not employ the word in the same way in his 
analysis of argument. [Cites].  
78 Merriam-Webster [get proper cite].  
79 See RHETORIC – KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 38, n. 40 (“Here… the role of character in 
speech is regarded as making the speaker seem trustworthy.”). 




on the authority of the speaker’s argument.80 For Aristotle then, proof by 
ethos did not proceed “from a previous opinion that the speaker is a 
certain kind of person.”81 Instead, persuasion by ethos “should result from 
the speech.”82 
 It is no accident that Aristotle called ethos “the most authoritative 
form of persuasion.”83 Ethos, properly understood in rhetoric, is 
authority.84 Certainly, it makes sense to conceive of authority as a distinct 
mode of proof in law. Sometimes a judge will determine that the law 
means X based on a reasoned interpretation of sources A, B, and C. This is 
proof by logos. Occasionally, as Greene points out, the law will mean X 
because the judge feels X is true “deep down in [her] heart.” This is 
persuasion through pathos. And very often, a judge will find the law 
means X simply because authority says the law means X. This is proof by 
ethos.  
Proof by authority is entirely different than proof by reason or 
through emotion. Greene practically acknowledges as much, noting at one 
point that “the ipse dixit character of [] argumentation suggests an ethical 
cast.”85 Ipse dixit (“he, himself said it”) is the paragon of argument based 
on naked authority rather than reason. Of course, every ethos-based 
argument need not make such a raw appeal to power. The point is just that 
ethos persuades through the authority of “character,” not through character 
itself. Equally important, ethos need not derive from moral authority to 
                                                
80 Id. at 38-39 and n. 41 (“Unlike Isocrates [], Aristotle does not include in rhetorical 
ethos the authority that the speaker may possess due to position in government or society, 
previous actions, reputation, or anything except what is actually said in speech.”). 
81 Id. at 39. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Though I see this as entirely consistent with Aristotle, I concede that he did not directly 
advocate this position. However, building upon Aristotle’s insights is standard practice in 
Neo-Aristotelian argument theory. Thus, Stephen Toulmin proposed his canonical 
argument schema to correct the ambiguities in Aristotle’s syllogism between major 
premise and backing for major premise. TOULMIN, supra note 28, at 100-05. For his part, 
Chaїm Perelman rejected Aristotle’s distinction between rhetoric and dialectic to advance 
his unified theory of argument. See supra note 59. Though Aristotle provides the starting 
point for any analysis of ethos, we need not give him the Last Word. 






persuade. Depending on the discourse, successful authority can also be 
legal, religious, parental, academic and so on. 
B. Morals and Values  
Although Bobbitt’s category of ethical argument shares its 
etymology with rhetorical ethos, the underlying concept is very different. 
Bobbitt uses the category to elucidate a particular kind of moral discourse 
in constitutional debate. By removing Bobbitt’s ethical argument from his 
list of legitimate topoi, Greene effectively argues that reasoned (logical) 
discussion of values has no legitimate place in constitutional law. To 
demonstrate this, Figure 3 below lists side-by-side the legitimate argument 
topoi recognized by Bobbitt,86 Fallon,87 and Greene.88 
 
Bobbitt Fallon Greene 
Historical Framer’s Intent History 
Textual Text Text 
Structural Constitutional Theory Structure 
Doctrinal Precedent Precedent 
Prudential [Policy] Consequences 
Ethical Value  
 
Figure 3 - Topoi Recognized by Bobbitt, Fallon, and Greene 
 
The most striking feature of Figure 3 is the level of agreement 
between these three prominent constitutional law theorists. The consensus 
is ironclad on four topoi: history (relying on the intentions of framers and 
ratifiers of the Constitution);89 text (looking to the semantic meaning of 
                                                
86 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 12-13. 
87 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1195-1209 
88 See Greene, Pathos at 1443. 
89 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 12. Greene adopts Bobbitt’s term 
here. Greene, Pathos at 1443. Although Fallon calls this topos “Framer’s Intent”, see 




the words and phrases in the Constitution);90 structure (inferring rules 
from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures 
it sets up);91 and precedent (applying rules generated by doctrine).92 The 
fifth topos – consequences (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a 
particular rule) – also counts as an essentially agreed-upon category even 
though the three theorists adopt different terms.93 
This leaves one final topos. Bobbitt calls it ethical argument while 
Fallon calls it value argument. Greene offers no comparable legitimate 
subject of argument. This is unfortunate. Indeed, this omission actually 
undermines Greene’s own admirable commitment to promoting 
democratic deliberation in constitutional law in light of our polity’s core 
values.94 The fatal flaw in Greene’s approach is that it relegates all value 
debate to pathos through emotional appeals to history, text, structure, 
precedent and consequences. Yet rational logos-based debate over values 
is both a regular feature of constitutional discourse and normatively 
desirable.95 Our constitutional argument typology should reflect this by 
including value as a legitimate subject. 
                                                                                                                     
Fallon, supra note 19 at 1198-99, its synonymy with Bobbitt’s and Greene’s category is 
self-evident. 
90 See, e.g., BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 12. The consensus is so 
complete on this topos that all three use the same word in the same way. 
91 See, e.g., BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 12-13. Once again, Greene 
adopts Bobbitt’s term. Greene, Pathos at 1443. As Greene notes, Fallon’s category of 
“constitutional theory” captures precisely the same subject of argument. Id. at 1424, n. 
180. 
92 See Greene, Pathos at 1424. Though Bobbitt calls his category “Doctrinal,” the 
relationship to precedent is again self-evident.  
93 Greene explicitly aligns his notion of argument from “consequences” with Bobbitt’s 
“prudential” category. See Greene, Pathos at 1441 (“Prudential or consequentialist 
argument… speaks to a certain judicial pragmatism that recognizes that securing the rule 
of law over time requires the exercise of practical wisdom. Judges must attend to the 
political and economic circumstances surrounding a decision.” (internal quotes and 
citations omitted)). Although Fallon does not assign such policy arguments a separate 
heading (thus the square brackets and italics in Figure 1), he includes arguments about 
political and economic consequences under the general header of “value arguments.” See 
Fallon, supra note 19, at 1207 and n. 71 (acknowledging that his category of value 
arguments “sweeps in… policy arguments.”). 
94 See Greene, Pathos at 1452-6 (justifying pathetic argument as promoting democratic 
deliberation in light of values). 
95 See infra at Part V.C (giving three examples of logos-based value argument from 






To justify this conclusion, let us first revisit Bobbitt’s ethical 
modality. As noted above, critics have previously attacked this category of 
Bobbitt’s schema.96 However, this criticism largely strikes at Bobbitt’s 
particular implementation of the category; it does not question the abstract 
idea of a constitutional topos rooted in morality. Thus, Bobbitt’s abstract 
assertion that ethical argument concerns moral commitments in the 
Constitution is not the same as his specific assertion that the “only 
American ethos reflected in the Constitution is the ethos of limited 
government.”97 Rebuke of the latter proposition does not call into doubt 
the former. A similar analysis diminishes the force of other common 
critiques of Bobbitt and ethical argument.98 
 Yet we need not rely upon Bobbitt to see the sense of a separate 
value-based topos. Richard Fallon provides a more coherent and less 
controversial path to the same conclusion. Value argument plays a 
prominent role in Fallon’s well-regarded constitutional argument 
typology.99 According to Fallon, “value arguments assert claims about 
what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, as measured against some 
standard that is independent of what the constitutional text requires.”100 He 
further distinguishes between two kinds of cases in which value arguments 
have a conventionally accepted role: (1) cases involving “constitutional 
language whose meaning has a normative or evaluative component”;101 
and (2) cases “where arguments within other categories [of topoi] are 
                                                
96 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
97 Greene, Pathos at 1443 (citing BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION at 21; 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 144-6). 
98  Consider, for example, Professor Farber’s cutting critique of Bobbitt’s notion that 
fairness to Indians reflects the American ethos. See Farber, supra note 74, at 1332. The 
undeneiable reality of systematic mistreatment of Native Americans under US law does 
negate the idea that moral commitments of the nation are a legitimate subject for 
constitutional discourse.    
99 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1204 (“Sometimes openly, sometimes guardedly, judges 
and lawyers make arguments that appeal directly to moral, political, or social values or 
policies… Value arguments… enjoy almost total predominance [] in much of the most 
respected modern constitutional scholarship.”). 
100 Id. at 1205. 
101 Id. 




indeterminate or closely balanced” and values appeals are made to break 
the deadlock.102 
Fallon’s examples from his first category suffice to make the case 
for value argument as a legitimate topos. He notes that constitutional 
phrases like “due process”, “equal protection”, “unreasonable search and 
seizure”, or “cruel and unusual punishment” require value judgment.103 
The text itself provides no guide to determining the proper criteria for 
implementing these “essentially contest[ed]” values and concepts.104 An 
explicitly normative constitutional jurisprudence has consequently evolved 
in these areas that requires debate over “evolving standards of decency in 
a maturing society”105, “reasonable expectations of privacy”106 and so 
on.107 
Fallon’s second category of value argument is even more 
instructive. This category relates directly to Fallon’s analysis of the 
problem of commensurability in constitutional law.108 When modalities of 
constitutional argument conflict and point in different directions – for 
example, imagine that textual analysis points to one outcome while 
historical analysis suggests the opposite  – no meta-discursive mechanism 
exists to decide the conflict.109 Constitutional argument types are thus 
incommensurable. This phenomenon resembles paradigm conflicts in 
                                                
102 Id. at 1207. 
103 Id. at 1205 (italics supplied) (collecting cases in these fields). 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 1206 & n. 78 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2600 (1986)). See 
also, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (invoking “evolving standards 
of decency” in striking down mandatory life without parole for juveniles); Brown v. 
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1925, n. 3 (considering “evolving standards of decency” in finding 
California prison overcrowding contravenes Eighth Amendment). 
106 Fallon, supra note 19, at 1206 & n. 79  (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-
28 (1984)). See also, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (arguing that long-term GPS surveillance constitutes violation of  
“reasonable expectation of privacy”); 
107 Perhaps the most explictly normative standard in constitutional comes from 
substantive due process, which sometimes looks to the “traditions and conscience of our 
people.” See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3032 (2010) (quoting 
Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See also id. (referring to other value-
based substantive-due-process inquiries like “immutable principles of justice which 
inhere in the very idea of a free government”) (citations omitted). 
108 Fallon, supra note 19. at 1189. 






science.110 Fallon suggests that value arguments play a special role in 
these situations.111 When coherent arguments can be marshaled on either 
side of a constitutional question, values often do and legitimately should 
come into play.  
This does not mean that all value arguments count as legitimate. 
Fallon argues that the certain “repositor[ies] of values” can be accepted as 
legitimate sources for value arguments (e.g., traditional morality, 
consensus values, natural law, economic efficiency) while other sources 
are rightly rejected (e.g., a judge’s purely personal morality or religion or 
policy preferences).112 Importantly, Bobbitt and Greene also share this 
concern with articulating an acceptable versus non-acceptable role for 
value argument. Bobbitt’s unpopular solution is to tether acceptable value 
argument to an “American ethos.” Greene rejects Bobbitt’s solution but 
then does not deal at all with Fallon’s more direct approach.113  
Greene’s own solution is to tie all value argument to pathos. Of 
course, it is correct that emotional appeal has a legitimate place in 
constitutional discourse about values. It is also true that “emotion [] 
precedes and motivates assessments of value”114 and that “emotion reveals 
reasons, motivates action in service of reason, [and] enables reason.”115 
Therefore, it would be a mistake to universally condemn or banish pathos 
from arguments conducted about history, text, doctrine, structure or 
consequences. The emotional valence of arguments about these topoi can 
usefully invoke value into deliberation. 
Yet it does not follow that therefore all value arguments should be 
tethered to pathos. For it is more than possible to debate values in a 
                                                
110 Id. at 1191 (citing inter alia THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)). 
111 Id. at 1207 (“Confronted with contending theoretical arguments that are equally or 
nearly equally plausible, judges prefer those that accord with their views of justice or 
sound policy.”). 
112 Id. at 1208-9. 
113 Greene discusses Fallon’s schema in some detail at the beginning of his article, but 
then drops all reference to him as he gets into the mechanics of his new schema re-
classifying Bobbitt’s category of “ethical argument” as a mode of persuasion. 
114 Greene, Pathos at 1449. 
115 Id. at 1450 (quoting Terry A. Marony, The Persistent Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 629, 642 (2011)). 




strictly rational – that is to say logos-based – mode. Indeed, rational 
deliberation about values is critical for deciding close cases that require a 
frank assessment of our collective priorities. Fallon’s work proves as 
much. Emotion is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Greene appreciates 
deliberation about values, but his schema leaves no room for independent 
logos- or ethos- based proof about the subject.  
The simple solution to this shortcoming is to insert Fallon’s topos 
of value argument back into Greene’s rhetorical schema. Figure 2 
reproduced again below visualizes the reformed schema. Note how this 
new configuration still leaves room for all the kinds of pathetic appeals 
that Greene compelling defends. It just also opens up more space for 
understanding legitimate value argument in constitutional law. 
Recognizing value argument as a legitimate topos invites rhetorical 
analysis of Perelman’s vital concept of “value hierarchies.”116  
 
 
Figure 2 – Constitutional Modalities: Union of Pisteis and Topoi 
 
Before exploring some examples of value argument in action, a 
brief note about the visualization is in order. The grid’s solid lines should 
not be read to imply solid boundaries between different topoi and pisteis. 
On the contrary, real life constitutional arguments often defy neat 
categorization and any given argument may implicate more than one 
                                                






constitutional subject or mix appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos. Yet this 
fluid and multi-faceted reality does not undermine the grid’s schematic 
utility. The map is not the territory; it is rather a tool to help identify and 
navigate the complex dynamics of persuasion in constitutional discourse. 
C. Three Examples of Value Argument 
Having set out the rhetorical theory, the time has come to examine 
value argument in practice. We will consider three brief examples: one 
taken from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence two from the First 
Amendment realm. Each example considers the phenomenon from a 
different angle. Taken together, the examples illustrate the centrality of 
value argument to our deepest constitutional conflicts. 
  Consider first Maryland v. King.117 King was a 5-4 decision in 
which the majority upheld Maryland’s law authorizing the collection and 
analysis of DNA taken from people arrested for, but not convicted of, 
certain serious crimes.118 Debate in the case formally turned on topoi of 
doctrine and consequences.119 Yet the conflict also implicated values at a 
very deep level. In his dissent’s conclusion, Justice Scalia wrote: 
Today's judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of 
solving more crimes; then again, so would the taking 
of DNA samples from anyone who flies on an airplane (…), 
applies for a driver's license, or attends a public school. 
Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. 
But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our 
liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for 
royal inspection.120 
 
This short passage is pure value argument. And it relies upon logos, ethos, 
and pathos to condemn the majority’s decision.  
                                                
117 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958 (2013). 
118 Id. at 1958. 
119 Doctrinal argument included whether King’s case fell under prior caselaw requiring 
“individualized suspicion” versus more general “reasonableness.” See, e.g., id. at 1969-70 
(analyzing cases). Compare id. at 1981-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering competing 
interpretation of doctrinal requirements). Arguments from consequences weighed the 
government’s practical interest in “identification” against arrestees’ reduced interest in 
privacy. Id. at 1975-78.  
120 Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 




The pathos in Scalia’s argument here comes in his reference to a 
“genetic panopticon.” He seeks to evoke a visceral reaction against the 
Maryland law by equating it with Big Brother surveillance. He does not, 
however, rationally justify calling an arrestee-only law a “panopticon.” 
Scalia’s reference to “the proud men who wrote our charter of liberties” 
and their likely reaction to the prospect of “open[ing] their mouth for royal 
inspection” sounds in both pathos and ethos. The humor is pathos. The 
reference to the founding generation and the implicit plea to their authority 
on this question exemplifies ethos.  
At the same time, the whole paragraph is framed by logos. And it 
is a logos rooted in value hierarchy. Scalia admits that solving crimes 
using DNA testing has value. However, he posits that this crime-solving 
value does not always trump Fourth Amendment liberty (he places liberty 
higher in the value hierarchy). To persuade his reader on this point, Scalia 
reasons that a contrary value hierarchy would justify taking the DNA of 
anyone who flies on an airplane, applies for a driver’s license, or attends 
public school.  Whether readers approve or disprove of Scalia’s logic here, 
there is no doubt that it is a logos-based argument about values.  
Few would dispute that Scalia’s analysis in King falls well within 
the realm of legitimate constitutional discourse. Yet Greene’s schema does 
not properly capture and categorize the justice’s arguments.  Under the 
unmodified schema, the logic of Scalia’s hierarchy probably would be 
equated with consequences (or perhaps history) and his discussion of 
value choices would be regarded exclusively as emotional appeal. This 
obscures the rationality inherent in Scalia’s ordering of liberty above 
security. Our modified schema permits understanding his value appeal as 
rooted in logos while still recognizing that his argument uses pathos to 
achieve emotional valence and ethos to enhance argument authority. 
The commonplace nature of Scalia’s value appeal in King bears 
emphasis.121 Weighing the value of solving crime against the value of 
individual liberty/privacy is a regular task of Fourth Amendment 
                                                
121 I use “commonplace” deliberately here because of its rhetorical origin. The English 
word is a translation of the Latin locus communis or the Greek koinos topos. See entry for 
“commonplace” in Silva Rhetorica available at http://rhetoric.byu.edu. In short, 






jurisprudence. Advocates can and should make value arguments animated 
by logos, ethos, and/or pathos when urging a particular Fourth 
Amendment outcome. And judges can and should consider such 
arguments. To see the situation otherwise – to view value argument as 
somehow illegitimate or beyond the pale – would impoverish the 
discourse and prevent its participants from speaking frankly about the true 
axis of disagreement in the conflict.122 
 The Fourth Amendment context is hardly the only one that 
requires honest debate over competing social values. First Amendment 
jurisprudence involves a similarly fundamental tension between individual 
freedom and collective interest. Arguments over the proper boundaries of 
speech or conscience often demand explicit value argument advanced 
through logos, ethos, and pathos. To illustrate, consider two final 
examples – one historic, one contemporary.  
The historic example concerns a famous pair of cases from the 
World War II era. Both cases concerned whether public schools could 
expel students who, for religious reasons, refused to recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance. Since we have until now focused on dissenting opinions,123 it 
is worth noting that the opinions analyzed here both state the majority 
argument.  
                                                
122 The rhetorical term of art for the axis of disagreement or point of issue in a dispute is 
stasis. See [Hermogenes of Tarsus + modern theorist (perhaps I.A. Richards)]. 
123 The focus on dissenting opinions follows from Greene. His examples of legitimate 
pathetic argument almost exclusively derive from dissents. Indeed, four of the five 
primary examples of pathetic argument analyzed by Greene are dissents. See Greene, 
Pathos at 1443 (table 1). The fifth example is not a majority opinion either, but rather a 
concurrence. Id. Though Greene does highlight this connection between pathos and 
dissent, it is important to note. One of the key rhetorical functions of dissents is to 
advocate for long-term change in the law. For this ambition to work, emotional valence is 
critical. For my own take on how dissents can change constitutional discourse, see Colin 
Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1293 (2012); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in 
the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Mayland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 75 (2012); Colin 
Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine, in PRECEDENT IN THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT (C.J. Peters ed., 2014). 




The Supreme Court decided the first of the two Pledge cases, 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, in 1940.124 Writing for an eight-
justice majority, Justice Frankfurter upheld the constitutionality of 
mandatory Pledge recitals despite the obvious First Amendment 
concerns.125 In a key passage, Frankfurter reasoned: 
Even if it were assumed that freedom of speech 
[applies]…the question remains whether school children, 
like the Gobitis children, must be excused from conduct 
required of all the other children in the promotion of 
national cohesion. We are dealing with an interest inferior 
to none in the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is 
the basis of national security.126  
Frankfurter concluded that national unity trumped other liberties in this 
instance because “the ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding 
tie of a cohesive sentiment.”127 Without question, Frankfurter’s opinion 
both declared law and weighed competing societal values. Yet his 
advocacy proceeded primarily by appeal to logos rather than pathos.128  
In West Virginia v. Barnette, decided three years later, a majority 
of the Court reversed Gobitis and declared mandatory Pledge recitals 
unconstitutional.129 On behalf of himself and five others, Justice Jackson 
wrote:  
The case is made difficult not because the principles of its 
decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our 
own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the 
Constitution with no fear that freedom…will disintegrate 
                                                
124 See generally Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Gobitis, 
the school children were Jehova’s Witnesses. See id. at 592 (explaining grounds of their 
religious objection). 
125 Id. at 600. 
126 Id. at 595 (italics added). 
127 Id. at 596. 
128 Of course, Frankfurter’s opinion did not rely solely on logos. At least one famous 
passage sounds in ethos, if not also  pathos. See id. (“Situations like the present are 
phases of the profoundest problem confronting a democracy-the problem which Lincoln 
cast in memorable dilemma: ‘Must a government of necessity be too strong for the 
liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?’ No mere textual 
reading or logical talisman can solve the dilemma.”). By and large, however, 
Frankfurter’s opinion is relentlessly rational. 






the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not 
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and 
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an 
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free 
minds.130  
In this passage, Jackson mixes pathos and logos. He acknowledges the 
case’s emotional stakes but appeals to freedom as a matter of both faith 
and reason.131  
The challenge of isolating Jackson’s rhetorical mode recurs 
throughout the opinion. Consider another line, which is among the most 
celebrated aphorisms in all of constitutional law:  
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion…132  
Is this an appeal based on logos, ethos, or pathos? Arguably, it is all 
three.133 Though his precise rhetorical mode is hard to pin down,134 the 
subject of Jackson’s constitutional argument concerns value through and 
through.135  
                                                
130 Id. at 641. 
131 The idea that we should have faith in freedom rather than fear freedom is an 
essentially emotional appeal to what we know “deep down in our hearts.” At the same 
time, the idea that mandatory patriotism implies weak societal institutions is a logical 
argument. 
132 Id. at 642. 
133 The pathos in Jackson’s statement is in his clear appeal to our deepest emotional 
intuitions about “our constitutional constellation.” His logos is rooted in his analysis of 
the implications of the opposite proposition – that officials can dictate what shall be 
orthodox. See supra note 131. Finally, the absence of any external authority for his bold 
statement shows that Jackson relies on his own ethos to advance his argument, which is 
certainly enhanced by the eloquence of his writing. 
134 The difficulty of isolating the precise appeal employed by Jackson thus stands as a 
vivid demonstration of the multi-faceted nature of many (constitutional) arguments. Cf 
supra at 26-27 (emphasizing the schematic nature of the grid).  
135 Contra Frankfurter, Jackson places freedom of individual conscience above 
“promotion of national cohesion” in the “hierarchy of legal values.” Notably, the 
particular kind of value argument advanced by Jackson here aligns perfectly with 
Bobbitt’s idea of an appeal to the “American ethos.” Here Jackson makes an argument 
about the “national character” of the United States. See supra at 22 (describing the 
practical equivalency of Bobbitt’s ethical modality with value modality). 




 Once more, few would dispute the legitimacy of such canonical 
statements of constitutional principle. Yet the fluidity of Jackson’s 
rhetorical mode makes clear that this legitimacy derives from the 
centrality of value choices to the Pledge debate rather than from recourse 
to logical, ethical, and/or pathetic appeals. In other words, it is the 
practical necessity and moral imperative of appealing to emotion when 
weighing the deep and conflicting First Amendment values of “national 
unity” versus “freedom of conscience” that renders Jackson’s rhetoric 
legitimate.136 
 For our final example of value argument in action, consider the 
Westboro Baptist Church military funeral case, Snyder v. Phelps.137 After 
Westboro members picked the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew 
Snyder holding their typical hateful signs (e.g., “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “You’re Going to Hell”), Snyder’s 
father successfully sued for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(IIED) and won a multi-million dollar judgment.138 In an 8-1 decision, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision to vacate the 
judgment on First Amendment grounds.139  
 In a classic solo dissent, Justice Alito harshly condemns the 
majority’s value priorities. The very first line of the opinion sets the tone: 
“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a 
license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”140 From 
there, Alito proceeds:  
Petitioner Albert Snyder is… simply a parent whose son, 
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. 
Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any parent 
                                                
136 To use Greene’s terms, the legitimacy of Jackson’s opinion derives from the fact that 
it addresses “constitutional subjects.” See Greene, Pathos at 1466. According to Greene, 
pathos is more legitimate when “the appeal seeks to persuade the reader of the substance 
or valence of an established constitutional subject rather than seeking more directly to 
persuade the reader of a particular adjudicative outcome.” Id. Freestanding pathos 
arguments lack legitimacy; they need tethering to constitutional topoi to be acceptable 
within the discourse. 
137 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
138 Id. at 1213-15. 
139 Id. at 1219. 






who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son 
in peace. But [ ] the Westboro Baptist Church [ ] deprived 
him of that elementary right. They first issued a press 
release and thus turned Matthew's funeral into a tumultuous 
media event. They then appeared at the church, approached 
as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a 
malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a 
time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, 
Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. 
The Court now holds that the First Amendment protected 
respondents' right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I cannot 
agree.141 
Alito’s pathos is palpable here. His prose invites the reader to imagine 
every parent’s worst fear, losing a child, turned into an utter nightmare 
haunted by malevolent fiends. He literally appeals to emotional 
vulnerability and condemns the majority for interpreting the First 
Amendment as condoning such brutality.  
 One viable interpretation of Alito’s pathos is that it lends 
emotional valence to his subsequent First Amendment analysis. On this 
reading, we can classify his argument under the doctrine-pathos modality. 
At the same time, Alito’s argument sounds in value-logos. Throughout his 
dissent, Alito intimates that basic decency requires the First Amendment 
not protect emotional attacks at funerals. He writes: “At funerals, the 
emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable… 
Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without 
harassment does not undermine public debate.”142 This is a perfectly 
rational argument about values. 
 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Snyder majority opinion.143 For the 
most part, he makes by-the-book doctrinal arguments. However, in a move 
likely designed to counter Alito’s passion, Roberts closes his opinion with 
a deliberately rational value argument: 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them 
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict 
                                                
141 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
142 Id. at 1227-28 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
143 Id. at 1213. 




great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that 
pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen 
a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public 
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That 
choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability 
for its picketing in this case.144 
Here Roberts acknowledges the emotional stakes and effectively admits 
that the adjudicative outcome rankles. However, he urges us to accept his 
conclusion based on a rational value hierarchy – chosen by the Nation – 
that promotes public debate over public hurtful speech.  
Taken together, a rhetorical reading of these opinions helps 
demonstrate the propositional/non-propositional dynamic described in Part 
III. The conflict between Alito and Roberts effectively pits a pathos-based 
strategy versus an ethos- and logos-based one. Of course, both jurists 
employ all three modes of persuasion in their opinions. Yet Alito clearly 
leans most heavily on emotion while Roberts makes his strongest appeals 
to authority and reason. Not coincidentally, Alito’s most persuasive 
argument concerns the injustice of the ultimate outcome: it seems 
intuitively right that Snyder should win and Westboro should lose. On the 
other hand, Roberts is more persuasive on when defending a general 
proposition about constitutional meaning: the most rational reading of 
First Amendment authority seems to be that it protects even hurtful speech 
on public issues.  
It is perhaps reassuring that logos and ethos appeared to trump 
pathos in Snyder.145 To maintain legitimacy, propositional logic should 
normally prevail above outcome-driven intuition. However, Alito’s pathos 
nonetheless fundamentally elevated the debate. It gave presence to the 
deeper value conflict at issue. His pathos forced Roberts to justify his 
conclusion with arguments beyond the doctrinal topos. And when Roberts 
weighed in on the value topos, he articulated the constitutional priority of 
protecting public debate over preventing emotional harm. The debate 
transcended the usual First Amendment morass of rules and tests and got 
                                                
144 Id. at 1220. 
145 Here it is worth rembering that Roberts spoke for eight members of the Court while 
Alito dissented alone. This was apparently not a difficult call for the Court as a matter of 






to the real point of division. Our constitutional discourse ends up the 
richer because of this rhetorical exchange. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional law and rhetoric project leverages ancient 
insights to offer a critical perspective on the dynamics of proof in 
constitutional discourse. Adding a rhetorical dimension to Phillip 
Bobbitt’s enduring typology of constitutional argument types makes great 
sense. However, a more rigorous theoretical grounding for constitutional 
law and rhetoric required correcting certain critical flaws in Jamal 
Greene’s new framework.  
The first correction pointed to the fundamentally adjudicatory 
nature of constitutional discourse. Unlike in formal disciplines such as 
mathematics, disputes in law cannot turn on abstract logical propositions 
alone. Because of the judgment imperative, non-propositional intuitions 
about right and wrong sometimes win arguments. This explains the power 
and inevitability of pathos in constitutional argument. It is a point entirely 
consistent with Greene’s argument yet one he failed to make.  
The second correction introduced the terms topoi and pisteis to 
clarify the key distinction between the subjects of constitutional argument 
(topoi) and the general modes of persuasion (pisteis). This taxonomic 
intervention both re-frames Bobbitt’s concept of modality and makes the 
new two-dimensional argument classification scheme more coherent. 
Coherent classification of argument in turn facilitates understanding of 
constitutional debates. When Supreme Court Justices disagree over the 
command of the Constitution, case-specific details often obscure the 
debate. By abstracting their arguments into a general framework, rigorous 
rhetorical analysis can reveal the constitutional forest from the trees and 
identify the true axis of disagreement in a dispute.  
As it happens, the true axis of dispute in the Court’s most 
controversial cases often concerns competing values. Therefore, this 
Article advocated keeping “value” on the list of legitimate subjects of 
constitutional argument. Not only does this bring Greene’s framework into 
line with those of Bobbitt and Fallon, it also comports with observed 




practice as demonstrated by examples drawn from Fourth and First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  
Though this Article has argued that value argument deserves a 
place among the legitimate constitutional topoi, it bears emphasis that not 
all value arguments boast an equal claim to legitimacy. Indeed, 
constitutional actors often hotly contest the legitimacy of value arguments 
and hurl accusations of “judicial activism” at each other. Yet this 
discursive reality is precisely what makes value argument so important to 
study and understand. 
Argument over the legitimacy of considering particular values and 
emotions in constitutional debate stand at ground zero of a larger struggle 
over the role of constitutional law in our society. Will constitutional law 
facilitate liberation and social change or will it uphold stability and social 
order? Different constitutional actors have proposed different answers to 
such questions over the course of our checkered constitutional experience. 
Recognizing value argument as a legitimate topos promotes rational, 
logos-based discussion of the hard choices inherent in the Court’s most 
vexing cases. 
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